The Influence of History

Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) under construction at Bath Iron Works in 1976 The United States Navy's Littoral Combat Ship program has come under extreme criticism from every side. Personally, I find much of the vitriol to be incredibly shallow and misinformed and believe that the program is actually a worthy endeavor. However, there is one clear failing of the program that I have seen virtually no comment on - it's glacial build rate. I have touched on the topic of the slow procurement of modern systems before, in my post comparing the production of the F-35 Lighting and the F/A-18 Super Hornet , and I believe it is important to come back to it in regards to the LCS program. It is well known be anyone with even a passing familiarity with shipbuilding that protracted construction of limited quantities inevitably drives up costs. However, in all the discussion of the possible reasons behind the price tag of LCS (which I personally believe is far from being as outrageous as ma

Kaga and Hosho at anchor prior to the Second World War Japan entered the Second World War with a force of ten carriers, while the United States and Great Britain each had seven. However, four of the Japanese ships were light carriers while all seven American ships were fleet carriers, meaning that despite the difference in numbers both carrier forces could accommodate roughly 600 aircraft. In Britain's case all seven of her ships were light carriers and could only accommodate a total of less than 300 aircraft. Japanese Carrier Force 12/1941 (capacity of 600 aircraft): Hosho - 168 meters, 25 knots, 20 aircraft Akagi - 261 meters, 31 knots, 90 aircraft (battlecruiser hull) Kaga - 248 meters, 28 knots, 90 aircraft (battleship hull) Ryujo - 180 meters, 29 knots, 40 aircraft Soryu - 228 meters, 34 knots, 70 aircraft Hiryu - 227 meters, 34 knots, 70 aircraft Zuiho - 217 meters, 28 knots, 30 aircraft (converted submarine tender) Shokaku - 258 meters, 34 knots, 80 aircraft Z