The Sinking of Afonso de Albuqueque: 1961
The December 1961 Indian invasion of the Portuguese colony of Goa resulted in one of the few surface actions of the post-WWII period. Although not well documented and little known outside of Portugal and India, the Battle of Mormugao Harbor and the larger naval operations surrounding it are interesting and worth examining.
After Britain granted India independence in 1947, Portugal continued to maintain its three coastal enclaves of Goa, Diu, and Daman. Although they were arguably more symbolic than economically important, Portugal resisted turning the colonies over to India and, in 1961, India resolved to take them by force. Operation Vijay (the name was later reused for a 1999 operation in Kargil) was a corps level joint offensive involving tens of thousands of soldiers, dozens of aircraft, and most of the Indian Navy.
When India gained independence, her navy consisted of a small force of sloops and frigates crewed by ex-Royal Navy sailors. Understanding the importance of a strong navy, she immediately embarked on an ambitious naval program, purchasing the gun cruiser Delhi (ex-Achilles of River Plate fame) in 1948. By 1961 the Indian Navy had grown to become a capable force, having added the aircraft carrier Vikrant (ex-Hercules) and the gun cruiser Mysore (ex-Nigeria) along with a collection of destroyers and modern frigates to the fleet. However, the Navy had yet to see action and many of its ships had only been in service for a few years.
For the attack on Goa, the Indian Navy was given two primary missions: the interdiction of Portuguese naval forces and the capture of Angediva Island. It also had the secondary mission of supporting ground forces with carrier aviation and naval gunfire. To accomplish these tasks the available ships were divided into three forces.
Delhi was dispatched to support the attack on the smaller colony of Diu, 400 miles to the north of Goa. There her 6” guns proved valuable in suppressing Portuguese fortifications and her landing parties assisted in the capture of positions ashore.
Vikrant and her escorts stood off to sea patrolling the area around Mumbai. From here she could cover both Goa and Diu as well as protect Mumbai itself from any attack by Portuguese surface forces. Her mission was to attack any Portuguese ships at sea as well as provide reconnaissance and air support for the Army if required. Her presence was also seen as a deterrent to any foreign powers that may have wished to intervene.
Mysore, the flagship of the operation, led the attack on larger colony of Goa herself. Not only was Mysore the newer and more heavily armed of India’s two cruisers, but the three frigates that accompanied her were the most modern in the fleet, all having been commissioned the year before. The Mysore group also included the old sloop Cauvery that had some minesweeping capabilities.
Mysore (Fiji-class): 170m, 10,000 tons, 31 knots, 9x 6” guns, 8x 4” guns, 2” armor deck, 3.3” armor belt (first commissioned 1940, entered Indian Navy 1957)
Trishul (Type 12): 110m, 2500 tons, 30 knots, 2x 4.5” guns, 2x Limbo (commissioned 1960)
Betwa & Beas (Type 41): 100m, 2500 tons, 25 knots, 4x 4.5” guns, Squid (commissioned 1960)
Cauvery (Black Swan-class): 90m, 2000 tons, 19 knots, 4x 4” guns (commissioned 1943)
Initially arrayed against this Indian force were four Portuguese frigates: Afonso de Albuquerque, Bartholomeu Bias, Gonsalves Zarco, and Joao de Lisbon. They were all older vessels designed to patrol colonial waters and were lightly armed for their size. However, days before the Indian attack, Bartholomeu, Gonsalves, and Joao were ordered home to Portugal leaving Afonso as the only warship in the area.
Afonso de Albuquerque (lead ship): 100m, 2400 tons, 21 knots, 4x 4.7” guns (commissioned 1934)
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| Afonso de Albuquerque after her 1956 refit |
Portuguese naval forces also included four patrol craft armed with 20mm cannon: Antares, Sirius, and Vega. These were based at Daman, Goa, and Diu respectively and played little part in the fighting. Vega sortied only to be machine-gunned by Indian aircraft, with her captain and gunner dead the remaining crew abandoned ship. Sirius was simply scuttled after her crew witnessed the destruction of Afonso. Only Antares survived the invasion. doing so by making a 530 mile voyage through Indian waters to reach safety in the Pakistani port of Karachi.
Some accounts also mention that Goa harbor was equipped with coastal artillery. However, I have been unable to locate any description of these guns and, if they did exist, they were likely older weapons, possibly no longer operational. Regardless, they played no part in the fighting.
The invasion began on the December 18th when Mysore and Trishul launched a morning amphibious attack on Angediva Island 50 miles south of Mormugao harbor. This operation was considered the main focus of the Indian Navy’s effort since the island’s garrison had provided casus belli for the invasion by firing on the Indian steamer Sabarmati on November 17th. After a short bombardment, landing operations by armed sailors began at 0700 and, after some skirmishing and further naval gunfire, the Indian flag was raised over the island at 1425. However, some Portuguese soldiers would remain at large until the next day.
This left the frigates Betwas and Beas along with the sloop Chauvery to engage the frigate Afonso. These three Indian ships had been patrolling off Goa for several days, observing events ashore as well as tracking the movements of the remaining Portuguese warship as she ran resupply missions between Mormugao and Angediva. The 18th found them on separate linear patrol routes 14,000 yards off the coast of Goa. Betwas, the flagship, was in the center with Beas to the north and Chauvery to the south.
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| Betwa, flagship of the squadron the sank Afonso de Albuquerque |
Afonso was moored in Mormugao harbor along with several merchantmen from various nations. On top of her missions to Angediva, she had been serving as a long range radio station for the colony since the ground station had been bombed. For her, the day of the 18th began when four Canberra bombers from the Indian Air Force struck the enclave’s airfield. Alerted by the attack, Afonso began raising steam while the Indian vessels continued to patrol offshore. Around noon Betwas received orders from the fleet commander to “capture me a frigate” and, after signaling her squadron to follow her, turned towards Mormugao harbor at a speed of 23 knots.
In 1961, the principles of naval combat were mostly unchanged from World War Two and guns and torpedoes still reigned supreme. While the United States had introduced limited antiship capability with the RIM-2 Terrier (1956) and RIM-8 Talos (1958) surface to air missiles, and the Soviets had fielded dedicated antiship missiles with the primitive SS-N-1 Scrubber (1958) and the more advanced SS-N-2 Styx (1960), such cutting edge technology was still only available in limited numbers to the most powerful nations and was entirely out of the reach of India and Portugal.
Instead, all four ships fighting that day relied on remarkably similar batteries of four medium caliber guns apiece. These weapons were all manually loaded and fired 50-60 pound shells at a rate of between 10-20 rounds per minute (Betwas and Beas were equipped with mechanical rammers but this system was unreliable and rarely used in British service). However, theoretical rates of fire are rarely reached and the number of rounds Afonso claimed to have fired over the course of the battle would represent at most 5.8 rounds per minute per gun.
Possibly more import to the outcome of the battle than the guns themselves were their directors. All the ships involved possessed centralized fire control systems. But in contrast with the Indian ships, the 1956 modernization of Afonso does not appear to have included a fire control radar. Further, it is likely that her gunnery computer was far less capable than the ones aboard Betwas and Beas. Still, the 6500 yard average range of the action was far short of the 17-21 thousand yard maximum ranges of the guns involved.
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| Afonso engages the Indian squadron (note that this rendition does not show the damage to the foremast and bridge) |
Beas, closely following Betwas, soon joined the fray, doubling the firepower pouring on to Afonso. Despite being outgunned and suffering critical damage early in the battle, the Portuguese continued to fight bravely, firing nearly 400 rounds and claiming two hits on Betwas (the Indians deny receiving any damage). But as Chauveny too opened up on the lone frigate, the superior Indian fire took its toll and Afonso soon had her forward guns destroyed, her aft magazine flooded, and her engines put out of action. Sinking and on fire, the Portuguese ship turned towards the northern shore of the harbor and, at 1235, went aground in ten feet of water off the Donna Paula jetty.
At this point the Indian account states that Afonso raised a large white flag and the Indian force ceased fire and withdrew. The Portuguese account claims that while nonessential crew abandoned ship at 1235, the gun crews kept firing until 1310. Either way, the result of the battle was clear and the Indian Navy had won its first victory at sea. Despite the heavy damage that she received, Afonso had remarkably few casualties - merely 5 dead and 13 wounded out of a complement of nearly 200. However, the ship herself was a total loss. When Indian salvage crews reached her they found that she had been gutted and warped by uncontrolled fires and she was later sold for scrap.
On top of the purely historical interest of these events, there are a few lessons to be learned from this nearly forgotten episode of history. The first is that surface ships continue to play a vital role in naval warfare. Even though India possessed unquestionable air supremacy, the endurance and firepower of surface combatants was required to blockade the Portuguese enclaves, bombard defensive positions, and ultimately sink Afonso. On the Portuguese side we see the utility of even lightly armed surface combatants in unorthodox roles such as running supplies to an island garrison or acting as a communications relay. Further, Afonso and the other Portuguese frigates acted as an effective fleet in being, forcing India to deploy far more powerful naval resources to be sure of thwarting any possible Portuguese plans.
The second lesson is that aggression and a bit of luck can lead to very one-sided battles. Facing three Indian warships, Afonso’s defeat was all but predetermined. However, the tactics of the Indian squadron left much to be desired - they attacked without surprise in a disorganized fashion into confined waters. It was the passive actions of Afonso that let Betwas score early crippling damage and render the fight a one-sided affair.
Imagine an alternative scenario where Afonso had taken the initiative, chosen a good position, and opened fire as soon as the spread out Indian force turned towards the harbor. She could have crossed the T of Betwas and Beas, evening the field by presenting her four gun broadside against four bow guns of the Indian frigates. By firing first, Afonso rather than Betwas may have been the one to score early critical damage and could have taken one of the Indian ships out of the fight. This would have resulted in a one versus one duel until the slower Chauvery finally arrived, during which time the Portuguese could have inflicted further damage. While this chain of events would have required considerable luck and Afonso would have likely have still gone down in the end, these aggressive actions could have turned a proud Indian victory into a humiliatingly close brush with defeat at the hands of a clearly inferior force.
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| A notional map of the action - all positions are estimated from the description above. |
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