The Influence of History

Kaga and Hosho at anchor prior to the Second World War Japan entered the Second World War with a force of ten carriers, while the United States and Great Britain each had seven. However, four of the Japanese ships were light carriers while all seven American ships were fleet carriers, meaning that despite the difference in numbers both carrier forces could accommodate roughly 600 aircraft. In Britain's case all seven of her ships were light carriers and could only accommodate a total of less than 300 aircraft. Japanese Carrier Force 12/1941 (capacity of 600 aircraft): Hosho - 168 meters, 25 knots, 20 aircraft Akagi - 261 meters, 31 knots, 90 aircraft (battlecruiser hull) Kaga - 248 meters, 28 knots, 90 aircraft (battleship hull) Ryujo - 180 meters, 29 knots, 40 aircraft Soryu - 228 meters, 34 knots, 70 aircraft Hiryu - 227 meters, 34 knots, 70 aircraft Zuiho - 217 meters, 28 knots, 30 aircraft (converted submarine tender) Shokaku - 258 meters, 34 knots, 80 aircraft Z...

One of the best uses of history is to gain perspective on the present. Today, there is much talk in naval circles about A2/AD environments and the antiship missile threat in a potential war with China. However, there is surprisingly little reference to the very similar threat the Soviet Navy posed not so long ago. This comparison is particularly apt as the maritime strategies of the USSR of 1988 and the PRC of 2018 have much in common. Both were primarily land powers that had developed a defensive navy with significant blue water reach. In 1988, the Soviet Navy fielded a force of 64 submarines, 85 surface ships, and roughly 365 bombers equipped with some 1798 antiship missiles. In comparison, the Chinese Navy of 2018 has 48 submarines, 112 surface ships, and roughly 180 bombers and fighters that carry around 1590 missiles. While both navies also fielded missile craft and shore launchers, platforms of this nature cannot seriously contesting sea control and will be excluded from this...