Missile Threat - USSR vs China (1988 & 2018)

One of the best uses of history is to gain perspective on the present. Today, there is much talk in naval circles about A2/AD environments and the antiship missile threat in a potential war with China. However, there is surprisingly little reference to the very similar threat the Soviet Navy posed not so long ago. This comparison is particularly apt as the maritime strategies of the USSR of 1988 and the PRC of 2018 have much in common. Both were primarily land powers that had developed a defensive navy with significant blue water reach.

In 1988, the Soviet Navy fielded a force of 64 submarines, 85 surface ships, and roughly 365 bombers equipped with some 1798 antiship missiles. In comparison, the Chinese Navy of 2018 has 48 submarines, 112 surface ships, and roughly 180 bombers and fighters that carry around 1590 missiles. While both navies also fielded missile craft and shore launchers, platforms of this nature cannot seriously contesting sea control and will be excluded from this discussion. 

A comparison of the two missile forces, classified by launcher type

However, the above chart paints an overly optimistic view as it does not consider some important technical aspects the two missile forces. For instance, 56% of Soviet surface launched missiles were SS-N-14 Silex, which was primarily an antisubmarine weapon with only a secondary short range antiship capability. Further, the YJ-82 with its rather disappointing range of just twenty miles comprises 70% of China's submarine launched missiles. If we remove all of the more marginal weapons from consideration, we get the following revised chart.

A comparison of the two forces, disregarding short ranged missiles

With this revision the two missile forces are now nearly identical in size at 1362 and 1302 weapons respectively. However, the different divisions between air, surface, and submarine weapons now stands out even more clearly. Some 54% of the Soviet missiles were air launched while no less than 63% of the Chinese weapons are surface launched. This difference has significant strategic implications.

The aircraft that dominated the Soviet force structure excelled at launching massed attacks. Their high speed and long range would allow them to concentrate against against approaching naval forces and deliver overwhelming attacks. However, American air defenses were expected to extract a heavy toll from the attackers and Soviet airbases were vulnerable targets to air and missile strikes. Thus, the Soviet force was powerful but fragile and challenging it would have resulted in a battle of annihilation that would have been decided relatively quickly.

The surface ship heavy Chinese navy is the opposite. With no speed advantage over attacking ships, and armed with comparatively short ranged missiles, concentration will be difficult for Chinese forces. However, ships at sea are extremely survivable and can operate for prolonged periods without much support from facilities ashore. Thus, a naval campaign against China is more likely to become a battle of attrition that focuses on sinking ships rather than striking support facilities ashore.

Tactically, the two forces also present rather different challenges. The most common Soviet missiles were the air launched AS-6 Kingfish and AS-4 Kitchen. These were large (4-6 ton), fast (Mach 3-5), high altitude weapons (30,000+ feet) that were easy to detect but difficult to destroy. The Soviet surface and submarine fleets relied on similar weapons in the form of SS-N-12 Sandbox and SS-N-19 Shipwreck. These were even larger (5-7 tons), but traded some speed (Mach 2-3) for lower terminal altitudes (50-100 feet). However, given their high cruise altitude and massive radar and infrared signatures, this low altitude phase was more to avoid long range weapons than to evade detection.

Though the Chinese Navy now fields a growing number of its own supersonic weapons, namely the air and surface launched YJ-12 and surface and submarine launched YJ-18 (both 2-3 ton low altitude weapons in the Mach 2-3 range), the vast majority of the Chinese antiship missile force (including 84% of its surface launched weapons) is composed of the small (one ton), sea skimming (15-25 feet), subsonic YJ-83. While defending against this kind of missile is less demanding in terms of reaction times and kinematic performance, it does require superior sensors to prevent them from reaching their targets undetected (as happened with HMS Sheffield and USS Stark).

Altogether, in a direct comparison of the threat posed by the two forces, the Soviets were more dangerous. Though the overall numbers of missiles is extremely close, the Chinese weapons are shorter ranged and launched from less mobile platforms, inhibiting concentration and likely resulting in fewer weapons per an attack. These same characteristics will also make it easier to destroy the launch platforms before they can attack.

While the Chinese weapons themselves are more difficult to detect than the Soviet ones, they are not truly stealthy and tracking them should not prove overly challenging for modern air defense ships. Once they are detected, Chinese missiles will be far easier to intercept and destroy. Finally, even if they hit their targets, the Chinese weapons are far less lethal. Not only were the Soviet missiles larger, faster, and loaded with more fuel and explosives, but Soviet antiship missiles were routinely armed with high yield nuclear warheads - something that China shows no sign of doing.

Further, while the threat has diminished, the defense has improved by orders of magnitude. In 1988, a nominal carrier battle group (one carrier, three cruisers, and four destroyers) would have around 270 defensive missiles. These missiles all had semi-active guidance and, with New Threat Upgrade, the unit could likely engage around fifty targets simultaneously. In 2018, a carrier strike group (one carrier, one cruiser, and three destroyers), could carry around 380 interceptors and, using missiles with active or passive guidance, engage over two hundred targets simultaneously.

US Carrier Battle/Strike Group defensive weapons by range band

Therefore, whenever we see apocalyptic predictions of Chinese missiles sweeping the seas clean of American ships, we should look to history and remind ourselves that thirty years ago a much less capable US Navy faced a more dangerous missile threat and still had every intention of prevailing.