Modern Naval Battles: 2016 Missile Attacks in the Red Sea
Surprising observers around the world, in October 2016, the waters off Yemen saw some of the most intense missile combat in naval history. Not only did these missile attacks highlight the extreme risk to any warship operating close to shore, they validated modern missile defense systems and demonstrated that front-line warships are capable of defending themselves from even sizeable salvos of antiship missile through a combination of hard-kill and soft-kill countermeasures.
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| Yemen - the events described all occurred in the Red Sea off the west coast |
Background to the Attacks
After years of steadily worsening political crises, in 2015 Yemen collapsed into full-blown civil war between government forces and the Houthi tribes of the west. Shortly after the fighting broke out in March, a Saudi-led coalition of Middle-Eastern and African nations intervened on the side of the government. This coalition was supported by the United States and made wide use of weapons (such as F-15 Eagle fighters and M1 Abrams tanks) purchased from America. However, under the leadership of President Obama, who had promised to end American wars in the Middle-East, America did not become openly involved and the conflict in Yemen went mostly unnoticed in the United States.
The prewar Yemeni Navy had consisted of several missile boats, including two Tarantul I, eight Osa II, and three Type 021, as well as a number of gun-armed patrol boats and minesweepers. The Soviet-built vessels were armed with SS-N-2 Styx missiles while the Chinese boats had C-801. However, many of these ships were inoperable (commercial satellite imagery from June 2015 showed two of the Type 021 boats had sunk at their moorings) and their missiles were over twenty years old.
After the war broke out the Yemeni Navy split between the factions, but the ships themselves do not seem to have participated in any fighting. Thus, the Houthis lacked any real naval forces and the Saudi coalition exercised undisputed command of the sea. The relatively modern navies of the coalition took full advantage of this situation, blockading Houthi territory and occasionally conducting naval bombardments. US Navy ships have assisted the blockade in intercepting Iranian arms shipments to the Houthis.
The prewar Yemeni Navy had consisted of several missile boats, including two Tarantul I, eight Osa II, and three Type 021, as well as a number of gun-armed patrol boats and minesweepers. The Soviet-built vessels were armed with SS-N-2 Styx missiles while the Chinese boats had C-801. However, many of these ships were inoperable (commercial satellite imagery from June 2015 showed two of the Type 021 boats had sunk at their moorings) and their missiles were over twenty years old.
After the war broke out the Yemeni Navy split between the factions, but the ships themselves do not seem to have participated in any fighting. Thus, the Houthis lacked any real naval forces and the Saudi coalition exercised undisputed command of the sea. The relatively modern navies of the coalition took full advantage of this situation, blockading Houthi territory and occasionally conducting naval bombardments. US Navy ships have assisted the blockade in intercepting Iranian arms shipments to the Houthis.
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| A Chinese YJ-8 antiship missile (export designation C-801) alongside its launch canister |
The First Shore-Launched Missile Attacks
Beginning in late 2015, the Houthis attempted to strike back at the coalition blockade in a series of attacks using shore based antiship missiles. The Houthis claimed that the attacks all sank coalition ships, while the coalition denied any damage. These claims are clearly irreconcilable and both sides have proven willing to lie about such matters. However, as no coalition ships mysteriously vanished, and photographic evidence of any damage has yet to surface almost three years later, we should probably accept the coalition's word in this case.
The exact missiles used in these attacks remain unknown. The best candidates are either the C-801 missiles from the Type 021 missile boats or Iranian Noor missiles (a copy of the Chinese C-802A) that were smuggled through the blockade. Actual Chinese C-802 missiles are rather unlikely as, contrary to several reports, Yemen possessed no such weapons before the war. Because of a certain detail about one of the later attacks, I tend to believe that C-801 missiles were used.
After three failed attacks, the Houthi forces scored their first success on October 1, 2016 when the the fast catamaran transport Swift was hit by a Houthi attack before dawn. Video footage was released by the rebels showing Swift's distinctive bridge on fire and photos of the damage soon became available. Swift was built in Australia as part of the US military's Joint Highspeed Vessel project but was privately owned and leased to civilian Military Sealift Command. In 2013 the lease expired, and in 2015 she was sold to a company in the United Arab Emirates, which then leased her to the UAE military. The coalition claims that at the time of the attack she was on a humanitarian mission and that her crew took no casualties. However, both of these claims should be taken with a grain of salt.
The exact missiles used in these attacks remain unknown. The best candidates are either the C-801 missiles from the Type 021 missile boats or Iranian Noor missiles (a copy of the Chinese C-802A) that were smuggled through the blockade. Actual Chinese C-802 missiles are rather unlikely as, contrary to several reports, Yemen possessed no such weapons before the war. Because of a certain detail about one of the later attacks, I tend to believe that C-801 missiles were used.
After three failed attacks, the Houthi forces scored their first success on October 1, 2016 when the the fast catamaran transport Swift was hit by a Houthi attack before dawn. Video footage was released by the rebels showing Swift's distinctive bridge on fire and photos of the damage soon became available. Swift was built in Australia as part of the US military's Joint Highspeed Vessel project but was privately owned and leased to civilian Military Sealift Command. In 2013 the lease expired, and in 2015 she was sold to a company in the United Arab Emirates, which then leased her to the UAE military. The coalition claims that at the time of the attack she was on a humanitarian mission and that her crew took no casualties. However, both of these claims should be taken with a grain of salt.
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| Swift after the attack |
America Intervenes
The United States responded to this attack by deploying a small surface group to the region. This group consisted of the Flight IIA Arleigh Burke-class destroyers Mason (DDG-87) and Nitze (DDG-94) as well as the converted Austin-class landing ship Ponce (AFSB-15). The two destroyers were well suited to a missile defense mission, being equipped with the Aegis combat system and armed with SM-2 and ESSM surface to air missiles as well as the Phalanx CIWS. They also possessed advanced soft-kill measures in the form of AN/SLQ-32 jammers and Nulka hovering decoys as well as chaff and flares. Ponce was more limited with only Phalanx, a weaker version of AN/SLQ-32, and chaff and flare launchers. Notably, she was equipped with the experimental AN/SEQ-3 Laser Weapons System, but did not employ it in any of the attacks.
Despite the formidable armament of these ships, at that point in history there had been only a single successful combat interception of an antiship missile. That was when HMS Gloucester (D96) used Sea Dart to shoot down an Iraqi C-201 Silkworm missile attacking the battleship USS Missouri (BB-63) during the Gulf War in 1991. But Silkworm, a Chinese copy of the venerable Soviet SS-N-2 Styx, was a large high altitude missile - a very different threat from the small sea-skimming C-801 and Noor. These weapons are close kin to the French Exocet missiles that had terrorized the Royal Navy during the Falklands War and had badly damaged USS Stark (FFG-31) in 1987.
The first test of the American ships came after they had been on station for nearly a week. On October 9, around 1900 local time, Mason and Ponce came under attack. Mason detected the incoming missile 30 miles away (probably when it gained altitude on launch), and engaged it. Sailors watched the explosion as the missile hit the water 12 miles away. Both American ships then maneuvered to put distance between themselves and the shoreline, with Mason keeping herself between Ponce and the threat. An hour later a second missile was detected and Mason again engaged, but the earlier maneuvering had succeeded and the missile crashed of its own accord 9 miles away. Over the course of the attack, Mason fired two SM-2 missiles, one ESSM, and two decoys (at least one of which was Nulka).
The Aegis combat system had proved its value, defeating a real world attack and allowing Mason to become the second ship in history to intercept an antiship missile. However, the action was far from over and three days later, on October 12, the Houthis tried again. This time Mason was escorting the landing ship USS San Antonio (LPD-17) north to the Suez Canal. At 1800 local time, Mason detected one inbound missile. She responded with a single SM-2 of her own and the attacking missile splashed down 10 miles away.
The Houthis apparently did not get the message and on October 15 launched what was possibly the largest antiship missile salvo in history. At 1020 local time all three American ships (Mason, Nitze, and Ponce) were operating together. Upon detecting the attack Mason took the lead, launching radar and infrared decoys and firing five SM-2 missiles (not reported at the time, this number was quietly revealed in the FY2018 Navy budget request). Four of the American weapons found their mark, but one missed. However, the remaining missile was seduced by a radar decoy launched by Nitze and harmlessly flew past the American ships. For the first time in history a warship had successfully defeated a complex missile threat in the real world.
Despite the historic nature of this final engagement, news of it was quickly suppressed with government announcements framing it as a "possible attack" that was "under investigation." Given that the Navy has since released the above details of the five-missile attack and awarded the Combat Action Ribbon to the members of all four crew (Mason, Nitze, Ponce, and San Antonio), the earlier announcements now appear to have been politically motivated with the intention of suppressing calls for further retaliatory strikes. Unfortunately, this means that sailors involved in this action have not received the public credit they so thoroughly deserve.
While the October 15 attack did not mark the end to Houthi attempts to break the coalition blockade of Yemen, which continues to this day, it was the last confirmed antiship missile attack in region. Although the Houthis claim to have conducted two more missile attacks in 2017, these appear to have instead involved suicide boats loaded with explosives much like the 2000 attack on USS Cole (DDG-67).
Despite the formidable armament of these ships, at that point in history there had been only a single successful combat interception of an antiship missile. That was when HMS Gloucester (D96) used Sea Dart to shoot down an Iraqi C-201 Silkworm missile attacking the battleship USS Missouri (BB-63) during the Gulf War in 1991. But Silkworm, a Chinese copy of the venerable Soviet SS-N-2 Styx, was a large high altitude missile - a very different threat from the small sea-skimming C-801 and Noor. These weapons are close kin to the French Exocet missiles that had terrorized the Royal Navy during the Falklands War and had badly damaged USS Stark (FFG-31) in 1987.
The first test of the American ships came after they had been on station for nearly a week. On October 9, around 1900 local time, Mason and Ponce came under attack. Mason detected the incoming missile 30 miles away (probably when it gained altitude on launch), and engaged it. Sailors watched the explosion as the missile hit the water 12 miles away. Both American ships then maneuvered to put distance between themselves and the shoreline, with Mason keeping herself between Ponce and the threat. An hour later a second missile was detected and Mason again engaged, but the earlier maneuvering had succeeded and the missile crashed of its own accord 9 miles away. Over the course of the attack, Mason fired two SM-2 missiles, one ESSM, and two decoys (at least one of which was Nulka).
The Aegis combat system had proved its value, defeating a real world attack and allowing Mason to become the second ship in history to intercept an antiship missile. However, the action was far from over and three days later, on October 12, the Houthis tried again. This time Mason was escorting the landing ship USS San Antonio (LPD-17) north to the Suez Canal. At 1800 local time, Mason detected one inbound missile. She responded with a single SM-2 of her own and the attacking missile splashed down 10 miles away.
The Largest Missile Attack
At this point the American government decided that something needed to be done about these attacks and ordered a retaliatory strike. That night at 0400 local time on October 13, Nitze fired five Tomahawk land attack missiles at three maritime search radars in Houthi territory that had been active during the attacks. The American government reported that all three sites were destroyed without collateral damage.The Houthis apparently did not get the message and on October 15 launched what was possibly the largest antiship missile salvo in history. At 1020 local time all three American ships (Mason, Nitze, and Ponce) were operating together. Upon detecting the attack Mason took the lead, launching radar and infrared decoys and firing five SM-2 missiles (not reported at the time, this number was quietly revealed in the FY2018 Navy budget request). Four of the American weapons found their mark, but one missed. However, the remaining missile was seduced by a radar decoy launched by Nitze and harmlessly flew past the American ships. For the first time in history a warship had successfully defeated a complex missile threat in the real world.
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| Mason returns home in December 2016 after her historic deployment |
Despite the historic nature of this final engagement, news of it was quickly suppressed with government announcements framing it as a "possible attack" that was "under investigation." Given that the Navy has since released the above details of the five-missile attack and awarded the Combat Action Ribbon to the members of all four crew (Mason, Nitze, Ponce, and San Antonio), the earlier announcements now appear to have been politically motivated with the intention of suppressing calls for further retaliatory strikes. Unfortunately, this means that sailors involved in this action have not received the public credit they so thoroughly deserve.
While the October 15 attack did not mark the end to Houthi attempts to break the coalition blockade of Yemen, which continues to this day, it was the last confirmed antiship missile attack in region. Although the Houthis claim to have conducted two more missile attacks in 2017, these appear to have instead involved suicide boats loaded with explosives much like the 2000 attack on USS Cole (DDG-67).
Additional Thoughts on the Attack
The above is all the factual information I have access to on the Red Sea Missile Attacks, and what follows is pure speculation. Given that it is unlikely we will see any of the tactical details revealed anytime soon, we are unfortunately left to puzzle out some of the more interesting aspects of the attacks for ourselves. The following may be entirely inaccurate, but I believe it is an educated guess at what occurred.
The other option is that the missiles were imported after the conflict began. However, antiship missiles are large and expensive items and not the kind of weapon that would be easily found on the black market. This suggests that any missiles would have needed to be supplied by an actual state. Very few states build such weapons and a state that doesn't could only supply missiles by taking them from its own navy. Currently, only sixteen states are producing antiship missiles and ten of those are the United States and her close allies. Of the rest, India is no friend of Muslim separatists, Pakistan supports the Saudi coalition and Russia and China, the most notorious suppliers of arms, also both prefer the coalition to the Houthis. This leaves only Iran and North Korea as possible suppliers. While North Korea cannot be entirely ruled out, Iran is far more likely source, and of Iran's arsenal, the Noor is the most common missile.
The reason that I believe the weapon in question was C-801 rather than Noor is because of the details of the first attack. In this attack the first missile was intercepted 12 miles away, the American ships put distance between themselves and the shore, and then the second missile crashed 9 miles away. According to one report, one of the Houthi missiles traveled over 24 miles in this attack. Given how the ships maneuvered and how close the two missiles came, it is almost certain that the second missile was the one that traveled this distance. This is relevant because C-801 has a published range of 42 kilometers (23 nautical miles). While it is possible that the second missile crashed because of jamming or a malfunction, I suspect that it was a C-801 that was fired from out of range and simply ran out of fuel.
So why the ESSM? Well, the second Houthi missile crashed at a much closer distance than the first was intercepted at. When this is coupled with the fact that ESSM was intended as a Phalanx replacement, it leads me to believe that SM-2 missed the second missile (or at least inflicted only minor damage) and the ESSM was fired as a second layer of defense. However, the incoming missile crashed before the ESSM could reach it.
Some quick math supports this hypothesis. ESSM has an estimated speed of over Mach 4 which would allow it to cover nine nautical miles in around 10 seconds. Adding a bit to account for the crew's reaction time and for the tip over from vertical launch, we could be looking at total system time of around 15 seconds. In that time the attacking missile (both the C-801 and Noor are high subsonic weapons) could cover around 2.5 nautical miles which means the ESSM was likely launched when the threat was around 12 nautical miles away (the 9 miles it crashed at plus 2.5) - which is the same distance at which the first incoming missile was intercepted, supporting the theory that ESSM was launched after SM-2 missed.
Applying similar math we can get some more information. SM-2MR has an estimated speed of Mach 3.5. Thus, it can cover 12 nautical miles in around 25 seconds. During the same time, the attacking missile can fly around 4 nautical miles. Given the intercept distance of 12 miles, this suggests SM-2 was fired when the target was about 16 nautical miles away. Both C-801 and Noor have terminal altitudes as low as 5 meters while the AN/SPY-1 radar on an Arleigh Burke is about 20 meters above the surface. Plugging these figures into a horizon calculator tells us that the missile will cross the destroyer's radar horizon at 15 nautical miles - well within the margin of error for our calculated 16 nautical miles.
While all of these figures are purely speculative, they combine to produce a very believable account of the attack.
#2 - The US Navy has almost certainly adopted a "Shoot - Look - Shoot" doctrine, firing missiles one at a time, rather than the often-quoted "Shoot - Shoot - Look" where two missiles are fired at each target. This has significant implications when considering the number of missiles needed for a saturation attack or the combat endurance of warships in an A2/AD environment.
#3 - SM-2 had exactly a 75% hit rate during the attacks. While eight missiles is a small sample size, we don't have any better information available in the unclassified world. Although 75% is far short of the 90% plus often touted by manufacturers, it is believable - especially against very low altitude targets. If accurate, this number means that having a multi-layer defense is vital and the Navy should possibly consider replacing Phalanx with RAM on destroyers and cruisers to add a third layer after SM-2 and ESSM.
What Missiles Did the Houthis Use?
As far as I have been able to determine, the only antiship missiles present in Yemen before the civil war were the twelve C-801 missiles on the three Type 021 missile boats and the SS-N-2 Styx missiles on the Tarantul I and Osa II missile boats. However, the Styx missile uses a corrosive liquid fuel and cannot be kept in a ready state, while the C-801 uses a far simpler solid rocket. Given the chaos in Yemen, I find it difficult to believe that Styx could remain operational. Further, C-801 weighs only a quarter as much as Styx, making it far easier transport the missiles and devise a ground launch system.The other option is that the missiles were imported after the conflict began. However, antiship missiles are large and expensive items and not the kind of weapon that would be easily found on the black market. This suggests that any missiles would have needed to be supplied by an actual state. Very few states build such weapons and a state that doesn't could only supply missiles by taking them from its own navy. Currently, only sixteen states are producing antiship missiles and ten of those are the United States and her close allies. Of the rest, India is no friend of Muslim separatists, Pakistan supports the Saudi coalition and Russia and China, the most notorious suppliers of arms, also both prefer the coalition to the Houthis. This leaves only Iran and North Korea as possible suppliers. While North Korea cannot be entirely ruled out, Iran is far more likely source, and of Iran's arsenal, the Noor is the most common missile.
The reason that I believe the weapon in question was C-801 rather than Noor is because of the details of the first attack. In this attack the first missile was intercepted 12 miles away, the American ships put distance between themselves and the shore, and then the second missile crashed 9 miles away. According to one report, one of the Houthi missiles traveled over 24 miles in this attack. Given how the ships maneuvered and how close the two missiles came, it is almost certain that the second missile was the one that traveled this distance. This is relevant because C-801 has a published range of 42 kilometers (23 nautical miles). While it is possible that the second missile crashed because of jamming or a malfunction, I suspect that it was a C-801 that was fired from out of range and simply ran out of fuel.
What Were the American Tactics?
Over the course of the first action, Mason fired two SM-2 missiles (almost certainly the far more common RIM-66 medium range variant), one Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile, and two decoys (including at least one Nulka). Attempting to reconstruct the action from this limited information is difficult, but I think we can make some educated guesses. With two incoming missiles, two SM-2 fired, and two decoys launched, I believe that the initial response to each threat was one SM-2 and one Nulka (remember, the two attacking missiles were fired an hour apart, so the first Nulka likely ran out fuel before the second missile was detected).So why the ESSM? Well, the second Houthi missile crashed at a much closer distance than the first was intercepted at. When this is coupled with the fact that ESSM was intended as a Phalanx replacement, it leads me to believe that SM-2 missed the second missile (or at least inflicted only minor damage) and the ESSM was fired as a second layer of defense. However, the incoming missile crashed before the ESSM could reach it.
Some quick math supports this hypothesis. ESSM has an estimated speed of over Mach 4 which would allow it to cover nine nautical miles in around 10 seconds. Adding a bit to account for the crew's reaction time and for the tip over from vertical launch, we could be looking at total system time of around 15 seconds. In that time the attacking missile (both the C-801 and Noor are high subsonic weapons) could cover around 2.5 nautical miles which means the ESSM was likely launched when the threat was around 12 nautical miles away (the 9 miles it crashed at plus 2.5) - which is the same distance at which the first incoming missile was intercepted, supporting the theory that ESSM was launched after SM-2 missed.
Applying similar math we can get some more information. SM-2MR has an estimated speed of Mach 3.5. Thus, it can cover 12 nautical miles in around 25 seconds. During the same time, the attacking missile can fly around 4 nautical miles. Given the intercept distance of 12 miles, this suggests SM-2 was fired when the target was about 16 nautical miles away. Both C-801 and Noor have terminal altitudes as low as 5 meters while the AN/SPY-1 radar on an Arleigh Burke is about 20 meters above the surface. Plugging these figures into a horizon calculator tells us that the missile will cross the destroyer's radar horizon at 15 nautical miles - well within the margin of error for our calculated 16 nautical miles.
While all of these figures are purely speculative, they combine to produce a very believable account of the attack.
Key Takeaways?
#1 - Modern warships can reliably defeat antiship missiles. This really calls into question the value of such weapons and may help explain the US Navy's relative lack of interest in antiship missiles after Aegis reached the fleet.#2 - The US Navy has almost certainly adopted a "Shoot - Look - Shoot" doctrine, firing missiles one at a time, rather than the often-quoted "Shoot - Shoot - Look" where two missiles are fired at each target. This has significant implications when considering the number of missiles needed for a saturation attack or the combat endurance of warships in an A2/AD environment.
#3 - SM-2 had exactly a 75% hit rate during the attacks. While eight missiles is a small sample size, we don't have any better information available in the unclassified world. Although 75% is far short of the 90% plus often touted by manufacturers, it is believable - especially against very low altitude targets. If accurate, this number means that having a multi-layer defense is vital and the Navy should possibly consider replacing Phalanx with RAM on destroyers and cruisers to add a third layer after SM-2 and ESSM.
