The Loss of Moskva and Lessons for the Future

Moskva listing and on fire before she sank
Moskva listing and on fire before she sank

Late on April 14, 2022, the Russian cruiser Moskva sank while under tow, making her the largest warship lost in wartime since the sinking of the Argentinian cruiser General Belgrano during the Falklands War almost exactly 40 years before. While the details of the sinking are unlikely to be cleared up anytime soon, and the war in Ukraine remains far too confused for us to draw any tactical conclusions, the event is far too significant for us to ignore entirely, and perhaps there are some relevant lessons to be found.

What Do We Know About the Loss of Moskva?

To begin with, we must examine what we know about the loss of Moskva, which is, unfortunately, very little. On April 13, the Russians announced that Moskva had suffered an explosion and that her crew had been evacuated. On the same day, the Ukrainians announced that they had attacked her with Neptune anti-ship missiles. While it is probable that Moskva was indeed damaged through enemy action, both sides of this conflict have repeatedly made such outlandish claims that it is unwise to take any reports at face value. Losing ships to accidents in wartime is also far from unheard of - the Japanese battleship Mutsu for example was lost to a magazine explosion in 1943 while in port.

The initial reports were followed by claims that the crew of Moskva had been evacuated and that she was being towed back to her homeport of Sevastopol. However, on April 14, she was reported to have foundered while under tow. Given that no warships of any size have been sunk outright by anti-ship missiles (HMS Sheffield, for instance, actually sank while under tow some six days after the well-known missile attack), these reports seem believable and could align either with a successful Ukrainian anti-ship missile attack or an unfortunate wartime accident. However, if the crew was indeed evacuated, it would seem to point towards rather significant damage that was considered impossible to control.

Given the paucity of accurate information, I will refrain from any attempt to analyze the tactical situation leading up to the loss of Moskva and instead focus on its effect on the future of the Russian Navy and naval warfare as a whole. As to the effect of the sinking on the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, I believe that it will prove to be limited at best. While there is great psychological value in sinking a major warship, Moskva was ill-suited for the current conflict and her loss should not noticeably impair Russian operations.

A test launch of the Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship missile
A test launch of the Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship missile

If she was indeed sunk by shore-launched anti-ship missiles as claimed by Ukraine, then the greatest material effect will likely be increased caution on the part of the Russian Navy in conducting operations close to shore. However, given that the greatest contributions of the Russian Navy to date have been long-range cruise missile attacks, distant blockade, and landing reinforcements and supplies behind the front lines, pulling back from the Ukrainian coast should not dramatically reduce the effectiveness of the Russian Navy. Indeed, it is something of a mystery why Russia has been so willing to risk major warships close to shore for so little gain.

Moskva - A Symbol of the Past

It could be said that the current Russian Navy is, in fact, two navies - the remnants of the Soviet Navy that Russia inherited and the new navy that is being built today. Despite far too many laymen and experts conflating the USSR and the Russian Federation, they are two very different nations with very different capabilities and objectives. Although there is, of course, significant continuity between the institutes of the USSR and those of the Russian Federation, there are just as many differences.

When the USSR collapsed, it was in the process of building a blue-water navy to rival the United States Navy. This left the Russian Federation with a number of large and modern warships that the new nation had limited ability to maintain and no ability to replicate. As noted by Mahan over a century ago, poor geography has always foiled Russia's attempts to become a maritime power, and the fragmentation of the USSR meant that the Russian Federation did not have the same access to ports and shipyards. Combined with this economic disaster that was the 1990s in Russia, the majority of the massive Soviet Navy withered away before the Russian Federation could reassert itself as a great power.

Unsurprisingly, Russia devoted a disproportionate level of resources maintaining the largest and most powerful warships it had inherited from the USSR. For the surface fleet, that meant the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, the four Kirov-class cruisers, and the three Slava-class cruisers. All of these ships were designed to function as fleet centerpieces, providing command facilities, area air defense, and long-range anti-ship missiles. However, while they were formidable for their day, these ships are now nearing the end of their life and, with the exception of the Kirov-class Admiral Nakhimov, have not received any extensive modernizations.

Moskva (then Slava) shortly after her commissioning into the Soviet Navy
Moskva (then Slava) shortly after her commissioning into the Soviet Navy

Laid down in 1976, Moskva (then named Slava) was the lead ship of the class and joined the Soviet Navy in 1982. Armed with 16 heavy anti-ship missiles (originally the P-500 Bazalt, later the P-1000 Vulkan), 64 S-300F long-range surface-to-air missiles, 10 heavyweight torpedo tubes, a dual 130mm gun, and a helicopter, she was a balanced design that was optimized for blue-water warfare against the NATO navies. However, her primary role was to function as a fleet flagship, supporting smaller destroyers and frigates.

The New Russian Navy

Over her 40 years in service, Moskva was a symbol of Russian strength, making port calls across the globe and participating in military operations in Georgia, Syria, and eventually Ukraine. But at the same time, she was being eclipsed by the new generation of modern Russian warships. Although they were not nearly as impressive to look at as the nearly 12,000-ton Moskva, it was the smaller frigates and corvettes of the Admiral Grigorovich, Steregushchiy, and Buyan classes that increasingly made up the backbone of the modern Russian fleet.

While Moskva likely provided valuable command and control functions during her wartime deployments, her heavy armament contributed little to any of the three campaigns she participated in. In fact, it appears that the only time she ever fired her weapons in anger was the brief bombardment that preceded the Russian capture of Snake Island early in the invasion of Ukraine. It was the newer ships that conducted cruise missile strikes deep into Syria and Ukraine, while Moskva and the other relics of the Soviet Fleet were confined to a supporting role, their Cold War-era weapons of little use against Russia's modern enemies.

Admiral Essen, one of the more modern ships of the current Black Sea Fleet
Admiral Essen, one of the more modern ships of the current Black Sea Fleet

The most recent Admiral Gorshkov and Gremyashchiy classes have even surpassed the old Soviet-era cruisers when it comes to providing area air defense for surface forces. The new Redut surface-to-air missile system with the accompanying fixed phased-array radars and modern combat systems are far more effective than the aging Fort missile complex with its mechanically-scanned arrays. In fact, all of the reported surface-to-air missile engagements by Russian forces in the Black Sea to date have been by the more modern Russian ships, with the Grigorovich-class frigate Admiral Essen claiming a Bayraktar drone just days before the loss of Moskva.

21st Century Ships for 21st Century Wars

If there is one lesson to be drawn from the loss of Moskva, it is that keeping old warships on the rolls is not an effective strategy. While large and seemingly powerful fleet units can appear to be a cost-effective way to maintain national prestige, when hostilities commence, these obsolescent ships become white elephants. The resources that Russia has spent in the last thirty years maintaining its Soviet-era cruisers could almost certainly have been better employed procuring more modern platforms and munitions - and any prestige gained by Moskva showing the flag in peacetime has been more than undone by her loss in wartime.

Today, the Russian Navy is not unique in continuing to field a large fleet of Cold War-era ships. In fact, the United States Navy is currently embroiled in a debate over whether to retire the Ticonderoga-class cruisers or further extend their service lives. While the relatively large budgets and economic stability of the United States mean that the members of the Ticonderoga-class have been far better maintained and upgraded than Moskva, her fate is a cautionary example that it would be wise to consider.

ROCS Tso Ying (formerly USS Kidd), possibly another warship kept past her prime?
ROCS Tso Ying (formerly USS Kidd), possibly another warship kept past her prime?

Perhaps a closer analog to the current situation of the Russian Navy is the Republic of China Navy. The four aging ships of the Kidd-class remain the backbone of Taiwan's maritime forces, and like Moskva, their once cutting-edge combat systems are now dated. Also like Russia, Taiwan has little ability to build new ships of similar size, although it has a growing number of smaller modern warships. However, unlike Russia, Taiwan's domestic shipbuilding industry has so far been unable to construct multimission warships, making the decision to retire the Kidd-class more difficult.

The loss of Moskva is a major event in modern naval history, and will almost certainly become an object of study and debate by amateurs and professionals alike. Hopefully, when the conflict in Ukraine comes to an end, we will get access to more reliable accounts of precisely what occurred (although given the mystery that still surrounds the 2008 Battle of Abkhazia, we may not be so fortunate). However, until then, the lessons that we can draw appear to merely reinforce the lessons of the past - naval warfare is driven by technology, and aging ships are a recipe for disaster on the modern battlefield.

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